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LONG WAVES IN POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS  :
THE CASE OF GREECE  *
by Jason Koutoufaris-Malandrinos
Le grand homme dʼaction est celui qui pèse exactement 
lʼétroitesse de ses possibilités, qui choisit de sʼy tenir et 
de profiter même du poids de lʼinévitable 
pour lʼajouter à sa propre poussée.
Fernand Braudel
1. I  ntroductionIt is known that Kondratieff waves reflect long-run movements in price indicesand interest rates, and, by extension, fluctuations in general economic activity.Can we discern similar patterns in politics and institutional change?I will attempt a comparative sketch of the political institutions and ideologies inGreece during the periods 1821/1831 to 1910 and 1940/1949 to 2015. AlthoughI do not discuss here the difficult issue of how the politico-institutional cycles areconnected to Kondratieff waves, it seems, prima facie, that the first period (1830-1910) covers a whole K-wave (1848-1893) along with the second half of the B-phase of the precedent wave (1831-1848) and the first half of the A-phase of thenext wave (1893-1905),  whereas the other period (1940-2015) covers just oneK-wave (1940-2008).1I hope to obviate certain objections by making it clear that my sketch is not aboutdisregarding the unique characteristics of every historical period, but identifyingthe common elements considered to be crucial to proper interpretation.
2.1.  First stage  :  Revolution and Civil War
2.1.1. This  stage lasts for about a decade  (1821-1831,  1940-1949),  beginningwith  a  national  (theoretically  supra-class)  revolution  (Greek  War  ofIndependence, Greek Resistance against the Axis occupation).
2.1.2. The  enemy  is  a  world-imperial  land  power  (Ottoman  Empire  in  theprocess of its incorporation into the capitalist world-economy, Nazi Germany inits attempt to transform the world-economy into a world-empire), whose rule isdeemed illegitimate as being gained through unjust conquest.
* This  article  appeared  on  bestimmung.blogspot.gr/,  and  is  available  at:http://bestimmung.blogspot.gr/2015/10/long-waves-in-politics-and-institutions.html.  For  anearlier version in Greek under the same title, see http://bestimmung.blogspot.gr/2015/01/blog-post_30.html. All translations are by the author unless otherwise indicated.
1 I follow the “base dating scheme” proposed by Goldstein (1988), p. 67. The application of the K-waves  to  the  study  of  Greek  history  is  still  needed.  Of  course,  there  are  a  few  exceptions:Sakellaropoulos (1991),  Mitrofanis (1991),  Mitrofanis  and  Sinarellis  (1995),  Tsoulfidis (2009),Konstandopoulos, Modis and Skillas (2006).
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2.1.3. Radicalism sets the tone of the revolution. Indeed, both the revolutionaryConstitutions (1822,  1823,  1827)2 and the Resolution of  Koryschades (1944)3are distinguished for their democratic and popular character.
2.1.4. The initial  radicalism is later sidelined, when the revolution becomes acivil war (1824-1825 and 1827-1831 [struggle between Kapodistrians and anti-Kapodistrians], 1946-1949).
2.2.  Second stage  :  Greece in periphery
2.2.1. This stage lasts for about thirty years (1831-1862, 1949-1974). 
2.2.2. Political  life  revolves  around  a  foreign-imposed  and  extremelyconservative  monarchy  (House  of  Wittelsbach,  House  of  Glücksburg).4 Thecommon people talk about “Bavarocracy” and “Americanocracy” respectively.
2.2.3. Under  the auspices of  constitutional  law (Constitutions of  1844 and of1952), the Rechtsstaat is  jeopardized,5 civil  and political rights are restricted,6while social rights are completely neglected.7
2.2.4. Government becomes more and more arbitrary, the Great Powers becomemore and more interventionist, and the lower classes become more and moremiserable.8
2.2.5. After  a  period  of  extreme  polical  policing  and  repression  (AthanasiosMiaoulis  “Bloody  Ministry”  of  1857-1862,  Military  Junta  of  1967-1974), thisstage ends with  the fall of the authoritarian regime (deposition of King Otto in1862, Fall of The Junta in 1974).9
2 Alivizatos (2011, p. 63) observes: “The ample protection of equality compared to all other rights–along with an early announcement of welfare benefits– expressed a rather unusual –among theliberal  declarations  of  that  time–  sensitivity  for  the  most  vulnerable  social  strata”.Paparrigopoulos (1887, p. 734) had even criticized A. Mavrokordatos for creating a constitution“polyarchic if not anarchic”.
3 See Koutsoubos (2003), especially p. 47 et seq., and more recently Skalidakis (2015).
4 A  further  similarity  could  be  the  prevalence  of  women  inside  the  palace.  “[Queen]  Amaliaseemed to act as if she herself were king” (Kordatos, 11, p. 669): a description equally suitable forQueen Frederica.
5 “Even after the concession of a constitution in 1844, King Otto managed to thwart the principlesof constitutional government”, by  using “a  combination of manipulation, patronage and, wherenecessary, downright intimidation” (Clogg, 1987, p. 2). On the other hand, the 1952 Constitutionwas  accompanied  by  a  Para-constitution (Παρασύνταγμα,  Parasyntagma),  namely  a  set  ofemergency decrees enacted during the Civil War (ordering purges, deportations, confiscations,deprivations of nationality, etc.), which overrode several fundamental constitutional provisions(see Alivizatos, 1979, p. 415 et seq.); a Greek version of McCarthyism (Samatas, 1986).
6 “Under the 1844 Constitution, there was a tendency to interpret the clauses on civil libertiesrestrictively and in favour of the royal powers” (Calogeropoulos, 2004, p. 371), while, under the1952  Constitution,  “a  departure  from  the  liberal  credo  on  constitutional  rights  was  clear”(Contiades and Tassopoulos, 2013, p. 154).
7 Social  rights,  enshrined  –“before  their  time”  (Alivizatos,  2011,  p.  51)– under  the  1823Constitution, were deleted in the 1844 Constitution. The 1952 Constitution “ne prévoit pas dutout et ne garantit pas les "droits sociaux"” (Manessis, 1954, p. 308).
8  See Vournas (1998), p. 373.
9 See Arrighi (1990, p. 38): “The rapid succession of "crises in dictatorship" in Southern Europe(Greece,  Portugal,  Spain) can be taken as the watershed between the "authoritarian" and the"democratic"  phases of prosystemic semiperipheral development”.  The authoritarian phase ischaracterized  by  a  common  predisposition,  which  “has  been  (1)  to  preserve  extreme  class
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2.2.6. In  each  case,  the  completion  of  the  stage  is  hailed  as  a  Metapolitefsi(regime  change),10 and  the  student  movement  is  formally  recognized  as  thecatalyst in the struggle for freedom (Skiadika in 1859 and Synomotika in 1861,11Athens Polytechnic uprising in 1973).12
2.3. T  hird stage  :  Greece in semiperiphery
2.3.1. This stage lasts for about thirty-five years (1862-1898, 1974-2010).
2.3.2. A new Constitution (Greek Constitutions of 1864 and of 1975) is ratified,which introduces a more democratic  –obviously, in the sense of representativedemocracy– regime. The head of state  (King of the Hellenes,  President of theHellenic Republic) is vested with considerable powers. As Anagnostou (2004, p.214) notes, “the President of the Republic according to the Constitution of 1975is undoubtedly the most equipped with prerogatives in the constitutional historyof Greece, prerogatives similar to those we could find in a crowned republic”.
2.3.3. Yet, only a decade after (1875, 1986), these presidential “super-powers”13are  drastically  limited,  and  a  purer  parliamentarianism  is  embraced(introduction  of  the  principle  of  declared  confidence  as  a  constitutionalconvention in 1875, constitutional amendment of 1986).
2.3.4. A relatively stable bipartisan system emerges, with a centrist party (NewParty of Charilaos Trikoupis, PASOK) and a centre-right party (Nationalist Partyof Theodoros Deligiannis, New Democracy) dominating the political scene.14
2.3.5. Socialist  thought  flourishes:  various  groups  are  formed  and  manynewspapers are published.15
2.3.6. Student activism gives birth to a new generation of politicians, which soondivests  itself  of  its  juvenile  radicalism.  Public  figures  like  Epameinondas
inequalities  in  the distribution  of  personal  wealth within their  domains,  and (2)  to  performsubordinate functions in global processes of capital accumulation” (Arrighi, 1990, p. 27). Arrighiputs  Greece  in  the  same  category  as  Argentina,  Uruguay,  Chile,  Venezuela,  Panama,  Mexico,Portugal, Spain, and Turkey (p. 26). This insight could enable a further understanding (throughcomparison) of the politics and ideologies of these countries.
10 Although the word is used today to depict the period after 1974, we must not forget that it alsodescribed the period after 1862 (Dragoumis, 1879, p. 320).
11 See Lappas (2004), p. 736: “Students also took part in political life. At least since the movementagainst  king  Otto  (1859-1862)  a  liberal  political  spirit  prevailed  among  students,  and  wasdynamically expressed during the  "Skiadika" (1859)”. See also Lazos (1987), p. 74 et seq., and111 et seq..
12 As stated by Epameinondas Deligeorgis (1863,  p. 3), “the University, by educating the Nation,generated the [1862] revolution”, whereas the Athens Polytechnic uprising “did not throw theJunta out”, but “it operated as a key catalyst for its fall” (Lazos, 1987, pp. 379-380).
13 Tsatsos (1988), p. 100.
14 “À la multitude des partis groupés autour dʼun chef influent sans programme précis, succèdent,à  partir  de  1880  environ,  deux  formations  politiques  à  tendances  plus  nettes:  les  élémentsprogressistes de la bourgeoisie, les intellectuels et une grande partie du peuple se rassemblentautour  de  Charilaos  Tricoupis.  Les  conservateurs  et  les  forces  du  vieux  monde  politique  segroupent autour de Coumoundouros, dont le parti, privé des ses éléments bourgeois, abandonnelʼesprit progressiste quʼil avait montré jusquʼalors. ce parti, dont la direction passe, après la mortde Coumoundouros (1883), à Th. Déliyannis, représente la résistance du passé et l ʼobstructionpure et simple aux efforts de Tricoupis” (Svoronos, 1953, p. 75).
15 See Noutsos (1990).
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Deligeorgis16 and many members of the “Polytechnic Generation” can easily becompared.
2.3.7. A general economic and political upheaval marks the end of this stage. Theupheaval starts off as a sovereign debt crisis (1893, 2010) and culminates in theimposition of foreign control over the Greek economy (International FinancialControl in 1898, Troika in 2010).
2.3.8. In each case, foreign control is made possible by a deep shock across Greeksociety (the “Unfortunate” Greco-Turkish War of 1897,17 the Greek government-debt crisis in 2009), felt by the people as a “national humiliation”.18
2.3.9. From the “restoration of Democracy” to the “crisis”, excessive governmentborrowing  is  justified  by  the  supposed  need  to  technically  modernize  andculturally westernize the country.
2.3.10. The hosting  of  the  Olympic  Games  (1896,  2004)  comes to crown the“national effort”.
2.3.11. Greece is a member of a monetary union (Latin Monetary Union then,19Eurozone now), but the crisis affects its participation in it.20
2.4.  Fourth stage  :  Greece during crisis   (1898-1910, 2010-2015)
2.4.1. The old political system, unable to solve the crisis, disintegrates and splitsup into competing personal factions. At the same time, any ideological differencefades away in favor of a putative national interest.21
16 See Kyriakidis (1892, p. 525): «Deligeorgis was not the beloved youth leader anymore; [...] hedid not like the university phalanges as he used to do; [...] but then he had been a dissident andnow he was in power· [...] So who was right? Deligeorgis of 1862 or Deligeorgis of 1873;».
17 Stephanou (1934, as cited by Katsoulis, 1975, pp. 226-227) highlights that “the 1897 war was apseudo-war, in order to impose on Greece the international financial control”, and he continues:“Our fatherland was disgraced and the blood of  Greek soldiers  was spilled and the innocentGreek people was involved in a premeditated fraud just for the International Financial Control tobe imposed, a control that not one government or parliament would dare to accept. At that time(1893-1898) the speculators had begun to gang up under the protection of the king”. Andreadis(1925, pp. 300-301), Kordatos (12, pp. 591-604) and Rodakis (1975, p. 45) emphasize Germanyʼsrole in the events.
18 Apparently, the Shock Doctrine is not so much of a novelty. War and market meltdown (alongwith coups, terrorist attacks, or natural disasters) is just different ways of inflicting it (see Klein,2007, pp. 16-17).
19 The Latin Monetary Union was established in 1865 and formally dissolved in 1927. Accordingto Einaudi (2001, p. 3), its similarities with the European Monetary Union are “at times striking”.After  all,  Félix  Esquirou de Parieu,  who presided over  the Convention of  Paris  in  1865,  wasalready proposing a “European Commission” and a “European Parliament” (Parieu, 1870, p. 355).See also Fendel and Maurer (2015).
20 Greece was expelled from the Latin Monetary Union in 1908, while its present EU membershipis constantly at stake: “Modern Greece [...] has been a threat and a danger to any monetary unionthat it has ever joined” (Cannadine, 2012).
21 From a “modernization” perspective, the rivalry between Old-partyism and Venizelism is alsoseen as a rivalry between “personal parties” and “parties of principle” (see Hume, 1741, p. 105 etseq.). This is a simplistic view. At least when it comes to the Trikoupis Party and PASOK, theyboth  had  a  quite  clear  ideological  orientation,  despite  the  fact  that  this  ideology  was  notrespected or even known by their adherents or voters (cf. Rotis, 1987, p. 266). But even if thiscontrast  “is  understood  to  be  based  mostly  on  the  structure of  parties  rather  than  on  the"principles" they stand for” and admitting that “"personal" refers to clientelist parties, whereas"party of principle" refers to impersonal party organization” (Mavrogordatos, 1983, pp. 66-67),
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2.4.2. Protests  and  strikes  erupt  in  violence  (Lavrio  Minersʼ  Strike of 1896/Patras Raisin Producersʼ Strike of 1896/ John McDowallʼs Engine Shop WorkersʼStrike of 1898/  Chair-makersʼ Strike of 1898/  Athens Printersʼ  Strike of 1898/Sanidika Riot in 1902/22 Lawyersʼ Strike of 1907/ Thessalian Peasantsʼ Protestsof 1909/  Volos  Tobacco  Workersʼ  Strikes  of  1909-1911,  2010-2012  anti-austerity movement).
2.4.3. Right-wing  extremism  is  gaining  ground  (aggravation  of  the  greeklanguage question in 1901-1903,23 rise of the far-right Golden Dawn in 2012).
2.4.4. There is an open constitutional question. The dilemma was then that ofmonarchy versus democracy and today that of subservience to EU elites versusnational autonomy. Scaremongering serves the ruling class as an argument.24
2.4.5. The  national  humiliation  is  exacerbated  by  the  caricature  of  the  “lazyparasitic southerner” that is disseminated through the media in core countries.25
clientelism persists till  our days and it has operated as a link between the electorate and thepoliticians, namely a form of democratic control; to use Humeʼs words into another context, “wemay,  therefore,  give  to  this  influence what  name we  please;  we may call  it  by  the invidiousappellations of corruption and dependence; but some degree and some kind of it are inseparablefrom  the  very  nature  of  the  constitution”  (cf.  Hume,  1741,  p.  89).  Moreover,  the  personalcharisma of the Old Partiesʼ leaders was an element that  Venizelos and Tsipras did not –andcould not– repudiate. – It makes more sense to perceive the Old Parties as parties in a process ofgradual and, by the end of the third stage, almost total convergence (Petridis,  1992,  pp. 85-86;Vernardakis and Temel, 2014).  That could explain the ease and eagerness to form an allianceagainst Venizelos then and Tsipras now.
22 “In late November of the same year [1902], following elections which had failed to produce aclear majority, supporters of Diliyiannis brandishing planks which they had taken from near-byconstruction  buildings  (hence  the  appellation  Sanidika),  roamed  Athens,  terrorizing  andattacking their political opponents; not surprisingly, on 24 November Diliyannis was sworn in asprime minister” (Carabott, 1993, p. 119).
23 In 1901, the adaptation of the New Testament in Demotic Greek (the modern vernacular formof the Greek language) caused a wave of violent protests, known as Gospel Riots or Evangelika.Similar protests (known as  Oresteiaka) errupted when Aeschylusʼ  Orestia was also adapted inDemotic Greek and was performed at the National Theatre in 1903. The demoticist translatorswere accused as “traitors”, “anti-Greeks”, “matricides” or even “pan-Slavists” (Van Steen, 2008, p.366). P. Mackridge (2009, p. 253) notes perceptively: “In the last analysis, neither the Evangelikánor  the  Oresteiaká  were  purely  about  language”;  rather  Demoticism  was  “demonized  bynationalists who connected it with the Slav threat and accused it of collaborating with Greece’senemies to divide and destroy the nation” (p. 288). Mackridge also observes that “the perceivedthreat of pan-Slavism in Greece at the time should not be underestimated: if pan-Slavism hadbeen established, it would have spread from Vladivostok to the southern borders of Serbia andBulgaria  –  wherever  these might  have been –  and there would have  been little  to  stop Slavirredentists from trying to complete the job by taking over regions that Greeks believed to betheirs” (p. 254).
24 Today we constantly fear a Grexit and its consequences, but the culture of fear dates back intime. Georgios Philaretos, MP and later “Father of Democracy”, is revealing: «Regrettably, duringthe discussion, impious threats were hurled against the independence of the country.  [...]  Theyexercised psychological violence over us by raising the spectre of the Great Powers! [...] How longwill we be tormented by this spectre anyway? [...] I must protest with all my strength and remindeveryone who thus speaks, of the equality and independence of each State, no matter how largeor small [...] We are a small country, gentlemen, but, however small we are, after so many sacredstruggles,  we mean to be an independent State.  The cannons that  we see from time to timegathered in the Port of Phalerum, it is high time they ceased to appear» (Philaretos, 1956,  pp.197-251).
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3. Beyond the fourth stageThe end of the fourth stage is marked by the triumph of Eleftherios Venizelosthen and of Alexis Tsipras now. Is this where the similarities stop? Not quite.
3.1. Venizelos and Tsipras are the first Prime Ministers to have been born afterthe “Metapolitefsi”,  that  is  during the  transition from the second to the thirdstage (1864, 1974). Coming from a middle-class background,26 they have gainedactivist  credentials  and  the  fame  of  being  charismatic  long  before  theirpremiership (Cretan Question during the period 1897-1910, social movementsduring the period 1999-2015).
3.2. Both Venizelos and Tsipras organize their political campaign along two axes,namely a slogan (abolition of the monarchy, cancellation of the Memoranda) anda programme (Larissa Programme, Thessaloniki Programme). Both campaignsconvey the message of a “peaceful revolution”, a catchphrase steadily used bySYRIZA,27 but it dates back to the journalism of Vlassis Gavriilidis, editor of thenewspaper Akropolis and a subsequently staunch Venizelist.28
3.2.1. The  slogan  has  two  main  characteristics:  first,  it  suggests  that  theconstitutional question will be resolved in a radical way, and, second, it is widelyattributed to the leader, but the leader does not explicitly accept it.
3.2.2. The Larissa Programme was announced by Venizelos  on 14 November1910,29 and  the  Thessaloniki  Programme  was  announced  by  Tsipras  on  13September  2014.30 Their  similarity  is  disarming;  they  both  aim  at  “nationalrecovery”, which would be realized mainly by:
i. stimulating demand.31
25 Stephanos Stephanou, Venizelosʼ private secretary, reports about the 1893 crisis: “The Germangovernment was foaming at the mouth, the German journalists were hauling our country over thecoals, and a Berlin satirical magazine published a cartoon of king George on horseback, dressedlike  an armatolos  (in  fez  and fustanella)  and carrying  a  yataghan  with a  legend "Der kleineklephte",  a Greek-German play on words, meaning the little Klepht, but also the petty thief. Thelarger part of the sovereign debt was in German hands. Kaiser was threatening to suffocate us”(Stephanou, 1929, as cited by Kordatos, 12, p. 527). Regarding Greece, this stereotype dates backat least to the time of Bayard Taylor, the American travel writer, who wryly notices: “About everythird day is an eorti, or holy-day of some venerable unwashed saint, or company of saints, whosememory is duly honored by a general loafing-spell of the inhabitants. The greatest benefit thatcould happen to Greece, and to all Southern Europe, would be the discanonization of nine-tenthsof those holy drones...” (Taylor, 1859, p. 76).
26  See Macrakis (2008), p. 42, 45, and Wallenfeldt (2015).
27  See Petrakis (2012), and Heyer (2015).
28 Gavriilidis believed that “the Peaceful Revolution is going to dislodge the established corruptoligarchy”,  and,  while  not a  communist,  he calls  for  the revolution “in the name of  the classstruggle” (Gavriilidis, 1909, as cited by Kordatos, 13, p. 78). According to Kordatos (13, p. 77),
Akropolis was  calling  for “a  peaceful  revolution  for  a  better  future,  a  reborn  Greece,  for  theextinction  of  the  old  gentlefolk,  for  the  reorganization  of  the  national  economy,  for  theimprovement of the peasantsʼ and workersʼ situation”. The resemblance with todayʼs demands isobvious.
29  See Venizelos (1910).
30  See SYRIZASYRIZA (2014).
31 SYRIZAʼ policy-makers are simply talking about “boosting demand”. Venizelosʼ language is farmore colourful: “Unfortunately, in the past, the direct connection between the national economy,
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ii. shifting the tax burden away from lower classes and onto upper strata,and basing the tax system on the real capacity to pay.
iii. reorganizing the state and advancing the rule of law; Venizelos was thefirst to establish a state governed by the rule of law,32 Tsipras commitshimself to restoring it.
iv. promoting an all-round balanced development of  domestic production;Venizelos stated, long before the left government, that Greece “is not poor,but unexploited”.33
v. regulating the labor market to benefit workers (in the words of Venizelos,“lucrative business, but in compliance with the law”)34, and thus reversingthe massive emigration of Greeks to other countries (which is –again inthe  words  of  Venizelos,  a  “terrifying  haemorrhage  of  the  nationalorganism”)35.The  programmes  are  hardly  anti-systemic;  rather  they  promote  a  kind  of“procataleptic  socialism”  or  “defensive  welfarism”,  namely  a  compromisebetween labor and capital,36 in order to mollify any revolutionary mood and toavoid  further  tearing  the  social  fabric.37 In  fact,  these  proposals  declare  aneconomic  policy  largely  analogous  to  that  already  followed  by  the  erstwhilehegemonic power38 in the world-economy (1906-1914 Liberal Welfare Reformsin Great Britain, New New Deal in the United States).39 Although this is more truefor the Liberal Party than for SYRIZA, let it be noted that both parties adopt thecatchphrases or even the symbols of this policy.40
3.3. Both  Venizelos  and  Tsipras  head  two  successive  governments  and  wintriumphantly  a  snap  general  election  between  them.  Before  their  firstpremierships, they are supported by an alliance of diverse groups, which assertnamely the citizensʼ wealth, and the budget revenues was forgotten, while it was also forgottenthat, if the sources of the great pool of national wealth remain always the same, and if the pipe –which empties the pool and fills the public purse– always widens, the pool (and thus the publicfinancial means) would end up drained” (Venizelos, 1981, p. 206).
32 Svoronos (1953), p. 88.
33 Venizelos (1981), p. 205.
34 Venizelos (1981), p. 206.
35 Venizelos (1981), op. cit..
36 Venizelos was very clear that his government “is neither a capitalist government nor a workersʼgovernment.  […] it is a national government” (Diamantopoulos, 1985,  p. 154).  Tsipras, on theother hand, hopes to see “a new balance in the relations between state and market”, with thestate “protecting public goods and functioning [...] as a driver for growth” (Tsipras, 2014b).
37 According to Venizelos, if the State enhanced the position of the working class in its struggleagainst capital, “the eruption of hate or even of a civil war” could be prevented (Venizelos, 1969,p. 331). Tsipras urges the need for national unity and unanimity (Tsipras, 2015b), and considershis victory as “a mandate to regenerate the Nation and restore the social cohesion of our country”(Tsipras, 2015c).
38 See further Wallerstein (2011), pp. xxii-xxvii, and Wallerstein (1996), pp. 58-59.
39 See Grunwald (2012)  and  Jakobsen  and  Pellegrini  (2014).  By  2012,  Tsipras  had  alreadyadmitted  that  he  was  “proposing  something  similar  to  what  President  Obama  is  trying  toimplement in the U.S.” (Tsipras, 2012).
40 The Greek Liberal Party (Κόμμα τῶν Φιλελευθέρων, Komma ton Fileleftheron, literally “Partyof the Liberals”) adopts the name and colours of Great Britainʼs Liberal Party. SYRIZA stressesdemocracy and a “European New Deal” (Tsipras, 2015a).
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an  ideological  continuity  with  the  first  stageʼs  revolution  and  other  radicalmovements; Venizelos is likened to an “oplarchigos” (: militia leader during theGreek  Revolution)  and  is  proclaimed  “Garibaldi  of  Crete”,41 while  SYRIZA  isinspired  by  EAM42 and  Tsipras  himself  is  characterized  as  “Che  Guevara  ofGreece”.43 Furthermore, both of them seem to be advocates of the “Megali Idea”[“Great Idea”] (either in its irredentist form or its europeanist form)44, althoughthey clearly understand it more as a precondition for prosperity rather than asan end in itself.45Nevertheless,  both  statesmen  soften  their  stance,  and  thus  they  are  heavilycriticized by their own parliamentary group. The snap election is used to a largeextent as a means of escaping the crossfire and of homogenizing the group oftheir supporters.In the process,  both the Liberal  Party and SYRIZA cast  off  their  more radicalelements  and encompass  many former Old Partiesʼ  members,46 including twoMinisters  out  of  five  in  the  Cabinet  of  Venizelos  and  three  Ministers  out  ofthirteen in the Cabinet of Tsipras.It is also remarkable how dramatically Venizelos and Tsipras managed to imposetheir will upon the people. While delivering his most important public speech on5th September 1910, Venizelos silenced an anti-monarchist crowd and insisted onpreserving the monarchy.47 In the same vein, Tsipras transformed a “no” vote inthe bailout referendum into a “yes” vote, by signing the third Memorandum.
4. Some conclusive thoughtsHistory is durations that intersect each other.  Cyclicality in History is not thesame thing as the movement of a pendulum. Social structures look like a strongwall,  human action looks  like a battering ram. History is  the ramming of  the
courte durée of our lives against the longue durée of social institutions. Blow afterblow, the wall remains standing but cracked. It takes a lot of blows –and perhapsa lot of rams– to tear down the wall, but in the end the wall falls.  Thatʼs why “aKondratieff cycle, when it ends, never returns the situation to where it was at thebeginning of the cycle”.48
41 Pournaras (1957), p. 226.
42 See Tsipras (2014a).
43 See Ansa (2015).
44 Constantine Karamanlis was the first to hail the European integration as the “new Megali Ideaof the Nation” (see Clogg, 1987, p. 73, 156).
45 “To the traditional political oligrachy, Megali Idea had an undefined and unrefined meaning,and it was disconnected from any different ambition (except, perhaps, for its use to discouragethe expression of social demands) [...] On the contrary, in the venizelist State [...] it repudiates itsmetaphysical, purely ideological or symbolical content of the past and … obtains an unequivocalsocioeconomic meaning” (Diamantopoulos, 1985, pp. 38-39). Tsipras expresses himself similarly;“"Our party as a whole wants to see the country in the euro," Tsipras has said, for example. But hequalified that statement by adding: "on the condition that social cohesion isn't threatened." Onanother occasion, he said the euro was "not a fetish" [...]” (Ertel and Schult, 2015).
46 “Venizelist deputies formed an ideological mosaic. Many of them belonged to the Old Parties”(Kordatos, 13, p. 233).
47 “From that moment, Greece had a governor. He had been acclaimed not by voice, but by silenceof the people” (Ventiris, 1931, p. 66).
48 Wallerstein, 2004, p. 31.
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Europe has already taken the path to being transformed into a German world-empire – again.  The war in the Middle East escalates. The refugee problem isalready aggravated – Tsipras has to deal with an issue that Venizelos faced adecade  after  his  first  premiership  and  under  very  different  conditions.  Ahegemonic war is not at all improbable.49 Fluctuat nec mergitur; this may not bethe case with capitalism.50Back  to  the  dawn  of  the  20th century,  Greece  was  trying  to  enter  the  core;nowadays  it  is  struggling  not  to  slip  into  the  periphery.  Venizelos  was  asuccessful  centrist  liberal  by  conviction,  Tsipras  is  moving  amidst  the  chaosfollowing the collapse of the liberal consensus. So, what is to be done?In  the  elections  of  September  2015,  some  comrades  considered  voting  forSYRIZA and supporting it as a mistake or even a betrayal.  They assumed thatSYRIZA (and Tsipras in particular) had cleverly deceived the people into morepassively accepting the TINA doctrine. SYRIZA, they said, achieved this goal bygradually  lowering  peopleʼs  expectations  of  what  a  Left  government  couldaccomplish; after all,  didnʼt the Secretary-General of Podemos (SYRIZAʼs sisterparty in Spain) write that “winning an election does not mean winning power”51?Nevertheless, the criticism leveled at the Left government for being ineffective orfor betraying the people can only be sustained within the conceptual frameworkof the two-step strategy – first take state power, then change the world. Thoughwe need more than this strategy. As A. Karitzis, a former member of SYRIZAʼsCentral  Committee,  puts  it,  “we  need  the  expansion  of  democracy  andcooperation  in  social  practices,  and  new  social  institutions.  We  need  socialinnovation for new forms of popular empowerment. [...] there is no other way toimplement  a  different  policy  today  than  to  liberate  and  use  the  embodiedcapacities of the people”.52So, I think that what has been viewed as a reduction of expectations is actuallyraising the bar.  If  we are responsible for our future,  if  socialism is not aboutachieving a remote utopia or following a certain “proven” formula, if we do notwait for the government to save the world, the formal political arena becomes abattlefield like any other – not, of course, an insignificant one. In other words,although we should support a party (actually, not just any party, but the mostviable option under the circumstances), this does not mean giving a blank check;our right to vote does not preclude our right to revolt – even against the verygovernment we voted for.According to novelist Asimakis Panselinos, Venizelos was able to give the peopleideals in exchange for sacrifices; “therein lied his grandeur”. These days we have
49 See Goldstein (1988, p. 353):  “As a first approximation, I suggest the period around 2000 to2030 as a "danger zone" for great power war. The greatest danger of war, in my opinion, willcome later rather than earlier in this period. Unlike the upswing that began with World War II,there is no great unresolved issue of hegemony left over from the last upswing period. Instead,like the upswing that  ended with World War I,  there is a more gradual erosion of an existinghegemonic  system  and  the  rise  of  potential  challenger  s  to  that  hegemony  [...].  Given  theexceptional costs of great power war in this era (see below), it seems that war would come onlyat the end of a long buildup with persistent pressure toward war”.
50 See Wallerstein et al. (2013).
51 Iglesias Turrión (2014), p. 176.
52 Karitzis (2016), pp. 376-377.
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made plenty of sacrifices; here and now we are creating our own ideals; thereinlies our grandeur.
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